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APPLYING INTERNATIONAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE REGULATIONS 
INTRODUCTION
In 1918, over 1 billion people (half the world’s population) contracted a virulent form of 
avian flu.1 Spain was the first country to report an outbreak of the disease, and that flu strain was 
subsequently known as the Spanish Flu. The virus killed more than 8 million Spaniards in one 
month.2 Influenza killed approximately 50 million people worldwide that year, including 
500,000 in the United States.3
In 2003, a strain of avian flu known as H5N1 spurred new fears of an epidemic in South 
Korea.4 Authorities culled the region’s entire poultry population (over 150 million birds) in 
response.5 To date, fifteen countries have reported cases of the “highly pathogenic H5N1” virus 
in poultry.6 Five of those countries have reported 120 cases of interspecies transmission to 
humans.7 67 cases have ended in death.8
While an infectious disease pandemic may implicate many parts of international law, 
most of those parts lack sufficient maturity to provide any concrete guidance during a pandemic. 
A good example of its limited usefulness is the application of human rights law in Case of D v. 
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2United Kingdom.9 The European Court of Human Rights held that Britain could not deport a
convicted drug trafficker back to St. Kitts. The developing nation lacked the health standards 
necessary to treat D’s late stage AIDS.10 To deport D would violate human rights norms against 
inhuman treatment or punishment because he would “spend his remaining days in pain and 
suffering in conditions of isolation, squalor and destitution.”11 The European Court’s application 
of normative international human rights law was arguably correct, and it seems noble for the 
developed world to aspire to such standards. However, a cursory glace over the history of 
infectious disease will quickly rid the Case of D of any practical application during an 
emergency. With some officials estimating 150 million human deaths in a H5N1 epidemic,12 the
United Kingdom would likely enforce its own conditions of isolation on suffering infected 
individuals if it meant preserving the greater population. 
Similarly, principles from the law of war or international environmental law tangentially 
address infectious disease through topics such as the treatment of detainees, the use of biological 
weapons, air and water quality, and deforestation.13 Like in Case of D, these issues have value 
during isolated incidents or in cultivating national policy. However, they provide no practical 
guidance in the prevention of or reaction to widespread infectious disease. Fortuitously, scholars 
and practitioners of international law have not been blind to the threat of disease. In fact, nations 
have been forming multilateral agreements to halt the spread of infection for more than 150 
years.14 Not surprisingly, the impetus for the original agreements was to protect the flow of 
9
 Case of D v. United Kingdom, 423 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (1997).
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14 Id. at ch. 2 (examining the history of international control of infectious disease).
3commercial goods and tourists across borders.15 However, as the world’s population has tripled 
to 6.5 billion over the last 50 years and national economies have become increasingly 
interdependent,16 priorities in the control of infectious disease have matured.
The overarching purpose of this paper is to outline and analyze the role of international law 
with respect to infectious disease. Acknowledging that other aspects of international law and 
domestic regulations play an enormous role, this paper will narrowly focus on the two major 
United Nations (“UN”) agreements that attempt to compel and limit the activities of Member 
States surrounding infectious disease: the International Health Regulations (“IHR”) and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”).17
Part I analyzes the transition from the old IHR to the newly adopted IHR and analyzes the rights 
and duties of States created by this framework. Part II similarly looks at the SPS Agreement, but 
analyzes in detail specific illustrations of the Agreement at work. Parts I & II both provide real 
and hypothetical examples of health emergencies. The goal of these examples is to create context 
for analyzing the regulations and to fill in some of the peripheral gaps created by the narrow 
focus of this paper. Finally, Part III notes some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
regulations by applying them to a simple hypothetical pandemic of the H5N1 avian flu.
15 Id. at 61.
16 Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050, U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, available at
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldpop.html. 
17
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Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2(2), available at
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4I. THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS
In March 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) plagued several parts of
the world.18 After nine months of outbreaks, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) reported 
“8422 cumulative cases world-wide with 916 deaths.”19 SARS was a first in many respects. 
SARS was the first severe infectious disease of the 21st century fueled by global air travel.20 As 
such, SARS was the first infectious disease not subject to traditional limitations of transmission. 
SARS would not have been able to “burn itself out” by killing off its primary population because 
it was not “an infectious disease confined to a particular geographical location.”21 Moreover, 
SARS was the first novel pandemic to allow WHO to appraise the potential influence of its new 
set of health regulations, which were in revision at the time of the outbreak. In 2005, after ten 
years of work, the Member States of World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR).22 The goal of this new convention is to ensure “the 
application of adequate measures for the protection of public health and strengthening of the 
global public-health response to the international spread of disease.”23 Not surprising, the 
revision of the IHR was “a closely watched and often controversial international legal reform 
effort” because of its implications on state sovereignty and independence.24 Nonetheless, these 
revised regulations have a large impact on the responsibly of state actors, the rights between 
18
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5states, and the authority of WHO in dealing with the control and containment of infectious 
disease.
The new IHR will become binding on Member States in 2007 (24 months after WHO
Director-General adopted them). 25 The old IHR, adopted 1951 as the International Sanitary 
Regulations (“ISR”), were much narrower in scope and intent.26 Under this regime, WHO had no 
enforcement capabilities, countries largely ignored many disease notification requirements.27
This disregard, in part, prevented disease control custom from maturing into binding 
international law.28 To understand the new rules and their effect on states, one must first examine 
the original IHR and compare it to the new IHR. 
A. The History and Development of the Old IHR
In 1851, industrialized nations held the first international sanitary conference. In 1951, 
WHO formally adopted the ISR.29 Between those two benchmark dates, there was little change 
in the objective of international infectious disease regulation. The goal was to “protect States 
against the international spread of infectious disease in a way that minimized interference with 
international trade and travel.”30 This principle concisely reflected the three primary obligations 
under the old IHR: notification, transport hygiene, and vaccination certification.31 Though 
appearing broad, these objectives were limited in three ways. First, these were the only 
25
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6international regulations to cover infectious diseases. Second, the only diseases covered were 
cholera, plague, and yellow fever.32 Third, the measures laid out in the IHR were “the maximum 
measures applicable to international traffic, which a state may require for the protection of its 
territory.”33 With this in mind, it is clear that the old IHR were a commerce -centered safety 
measure designed to react to spreading infectious disease and to prevent states from harming 
international trade by overreacting.
In the limited context of sea trade, these measures were comparatively reasonable. 
However, it is easy to see the immense modern shorting comings of a reactive system. Under the 
old regulations, countries were bound by honor to report to WHO any case of the three listed 
diseases.34 Such an idealistic requirement was doomed to failure. The poor countries with the 
highest rates of disease lacked the resources to report, where as wealthy countries lacked the 
incentive to report events that would harm trade and tourism.35 With the health and vaccination 
certificate requirements, poor countries lacked resources. Rich countries often “required health 
certificates for nonlisted diseases” because those disease (such as HIV) posed a greater health. 36
Similarly, the hygienic transport hubs requirements, such as clean water and food, health 
inspections, and appropriate quarantine facilities, were neglected.37 Again, poor countries lacked
the resources. The problem with the wealthy countries here was not execution, but effectiveness. 
Cholera, plague, Ebola, AIDS, and SARS often were not symptomatic infectious diseases during 
ingress and egress, but became so after transit.
32 Security: The New IHR, supra note 22, at 7.
33 Id. at 2524 (quoting the old IHR). 
34 Id.
35 INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 13, at 66.
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7These regulations failed because they were commerce centered and reactively designed. 
“Any new pathogen, or resurging old ones, not listed as ‘disease subject to the Regulations’ fell 
outside IHR’s surveillance system.”38 In 1995, with HIV/AIDS and the “proliferation of 
biological weapons” drawing attention to world health issues, WHO “started the process of 
revising the IHR.”39 In November 2002, the first cases of SARS emerged in China’s Guangdog 
Province.40 By August 2003, over 30 countries reported cases of the disease to WHO.41 “This 
outbreak and its effective handling by WHO” accelerated the IHR revision process.42 It was clear 
that the new IHR needed to be “a flexible framework that [could] respond to unknown disease 
events rapidly.”43 In May 2005, WHO adopted the new IHR proclaiming the “effective death” of 
the traditional outbreak/response approach.44
B. The Changes and Scope of the New IHR
Like the old system, the new IHR’s goals include avoiding “unnecessary interference 
with world trade and travel.”45 Unlike the old system, the new IHR’s proactive measures center
on public health and take qualified priority over commercial interests. To understand the new 
IHR, one must first look at the scope and overarching goals. First, the IHR applies to broadly 
defined events. Second, the IHR centralizes information at WHO and incorporates non-state 
actors. 
38 Security: The New IHR, supra note 22, at 16.
39 Id.
40
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8Whereas the old IHR was limited to a small number of specific diseases, the new IHR 
applies to communicable and non-communicable public health emergencies of international 
concern and encompasses both natural and artificial threats.46 The IHR defines a public health 
emergency as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) 
to constitute a public health threat risk to other States through the international spread of disease; 
and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.”47 This seemingly vast 
definition requires some unpacking. 
An international public health emergency exists when there is a manifestation (or clear 
danger of a manifestation) of a significant human medical illness that poses a threat to the 
international population or would require a coordinated multinational response. The language is 
broad enough to address ongoing long-term diseases (HIV/AIDS) and future wildfire diseases. 
Moreover, the language applies to current but merely perceived threats. For example, in October 
2005, both Romania and Turkey reported the first cases of the H5N1 avian influenza in Europe.48
With only 117 cases of human transmission worldwide, H5N1 is not a medical condition 
harming a large human population.49 However, the 1918 Spanish-flu epidemic claimed more 
than 50 million lives, and it “originated in birds before mutating and spreading to humans.”50
Thus, given the mobility of the disease, evidence of cross-border transmission, and the historical 
significance, the current virus “could present significant harm to humans.”51 It too, therefore,
would fall under the new IHR.
46 Id. at Annex I.
47 Id. at art 1.
48
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 IHR, supra note 17, at art. 1.
9The second important structural component of the IHR is the centralization of 
information and the use of non-state actors. Under the new IHR, WHO has the “authority and 
responsibility . . . to collect and act upon sources of information.”52 That is, WHO must collect 
disease event reports from States, must maintain qualified confidentiality on information, must 
declare international public health emergencies, and may use non-state sources of information 
concerning public health.53 When utilizing NGO data, the IHR “imposes duties on WHO to 
engage in such collection efficiently and effectively” and requires “WHO to verify such 
information.”54 According to one commentator:
The New IHR . . . [makes] non-State actors formally part of the governance mechanism of the 
revised Regulations. Increasing the scope of participation in this way highlights how the process 
of achieving global health security differs from the State-centric approach of international health 
security found in the classical regime. WHO’s ability to gather and use non-governmental sources 
of information and the obligation on States Parties to respond to request for verification of such 
information received from WHO mean that States no longer dominate or control the process of 
epidemiological surveillance.55
The value of this dynamic system is two-fold. First, the IHR creates incentive for States 
to report health event and mitigates the international impact because WHO can collect 
from NGO sources and declare public health emergencies in a State without that State’s 
consent. Second, it requires transparency in WHO’s process because WHO must verify 
NGO data and show effective data collection techniques. Thus, the IHR diffuses the 
disincentives of reporting health events that plagued the old system.
Within this broad scope, one can analyze the IHR’s content by dividing it into two 
components: (1) the obligations of states and (2) the rights of states. In this way, one can see that 
the new regulations take a formalistic international law form, which includes positive duties and 
52 Security: The New IHR, supra note 22, at 52.
53
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54 Security: The New IHR, supra note 22, at 52.
55 Id. at 51.
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enforcement. This allows the IHR to be the central international framework for combating 
international infectious disease.
1. The Duties of States Under the New IHR
The IHR unquestionably raises issues of sovereignty. Principle 4 of the instrument holds, 
“States . . . have the sovereign rights to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of 
their health policies. In doing so they should uphold the purpose of these Regulations.”56 Clearly, 
these regulations run into the same enforcement problems as other multilateral treaties. As noted
however, these regulations incentivise states, especially developed nations, to follow their 
obligations because there are no veto powers over WHO’s hea lth emergency reports. Annex I 
spells out the “core capacity requirements for surveillance and response.”57 In particular, Parties 
must “detect events involving disease”, “assess reported events”, “notify WHO immediately,” 
and “report all essential information.”58 Additionally, actors must create and maintain a “public 
health emergency contingency plan.”59 One can see that the responsibilities of states follow the 
overarching theme of the IHR: respond to the emergency and mitigate the damage. Specifically, 
the IHR places duties on States by building a streamlined event reporting system and by 
importing binding aspects of international law into the health regulations.60
States must follow the IHR’s decision instrument in deciding which events to report to 
WHO.61 This instrument describes three paths for reporting public health events.62 Each path 
56
 IHR, supra note 17, at art. 3.4.




61 Id. at art. 6.1.
62 See infra Appendix I. IHR, supra note 17, at Annex II.
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begins with a different class of diseases: (1) known diseases whose outbreaks are unexpected and 
serious (a new influenza strain or SARS), (2) known diseases with a demonstrated ability to 
become emergencies (plague or Ebola), and (3) unknown or potential threats. A state must report 
any case of (1), and must analyze the need to report to WHO in cases of (2) or (3) using the 
instrument.63 The analysis weighs factors of seriousness, expectation, risk of spreading, and 
impact on trade.64 For example, a case where a Romanian farmer contracts the H5N1 avian flu 
would satisify the notification requirement in (1). But if a rural healthcare worker in Zambia 
contracts Cholera, the threat of international spread is lower and the event is less unusual. Under 
(2), Zambia would not be obliged to report the case. By contrast, the same situation might trigger 
a report in South Korea where cases are uncommon, a high population density exists, and 
international travel is more common.
The other markedly different way that the IHR obliges states is by appropriating other 
aspects of international law and integrating them into the public health requirements.65 Though
states must satisfy the IHR health measures, the regulations do not preclude states from 
implementing domestic laws that “achieve the same or greater level of protection.”66 However, 
“such measures shall not be . . . more intrusive to persons than reasonably available 
alternatives.”67 This requirement invokes the Siracusa Principles, which “offer detailed guidance 
on the use of public health powers in ways that are consistent with human rights.”68 Unlike the 
decision instrument, which places a positive duty on states, the Siracusa Principles place a 
63
 IHR, supra note 17, at Annex I.
64 Id.
65 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, reprinted in 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 3, 7 (1985) [hereinafter The Siracusa Principles]; IHR, supra note 17, at 
art. 43.1.
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67
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the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations, 291 J. AM. MED. 2623, 2526 (June 2, 2004).
12
negative duty. They “require heath measures to be necessary, proportionate, and fair.”69 In effect, 
the IHR couches public health in the broader context of international human rights law. 
Take, for example, Canada’s first reported SARS patent in March 2003.70 The Canadian 
government amended the Quarantine Act and Regulations to “authorize detention of travelers 
with suspected SARS for up to twenty days.”71 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control now report
that the incubation period for SARS is one to twelve days.72 Suppose China reported ten new 
cases of SARS among dockworkers. If the Canadian government further amended its statute and 
quarantined all Chinese freight ships and crew suspected of carrying SARS for sixty days, 
Canada would violate the IHR. First, Canada’s quarantine of all ships would be over inclusive, 
i.e. “more restrictive of international traffic . . . than reasonably available alternatives.”73 Second, 
the Canadian measure would not be “based on scientific principles,”74 given that the average 
SARS incubation is four days.75 To quarantine ships and travelers for 60 days violates the clear 
language of the IHR.76 Moreover, the broader human rights protections in the Siracusa Principles 
require that “government infringing on the enjoyment of human rights provide justification for 
such infringements.”77 Thus, the IHR “balance sovereignty, science and public health” by 
requiring appropriate information and enjoining irrational or ill-suited reactions to public health 
emergencies.78
69
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2. The Rights of the States Under the New IHR
The IHR lays out the rights that states have against WHO and makes clear the domestic 
rights with respect to public health emergencies.79 Only a few of these need mentioning because 
the notion of rights of states implicates larger topics in international law. The value of 
enumerating the rights of states with the treaty is that it makes WHO accountable, and that it 
clarifies proper state action in difficult scenarios. Thus, the negative duties of WHO create 
positive rights for states. One example is confidentiality of information. WHO is obliged to keep 
all health data collected confidential unless there is a “public health emergency of international 
concern” or state control measures “are unlikely to succeed.”80 The value of this system is clear. 
The right to confidentiality encourages the flow of information and mitigates the unnecessary 
loss of international commerce, but does not extend far enough to threaten the public at large. 
However, this is merely a relationship right. The IHR also clarifies some activities that states 
may rightfully undertake irrespective of WHO. One broad example of this is the right to 
quarantine.
In April 2003, Singapore amended its Infectious Disease Act to “require persons with 
[possible SARS] to report to designated treatment centers, . . . enforce home quarantine with 
electronic tagging and forced detention; and allow the quarantine and destruction of SARS-
contaminated property.”81 Singapore used fines, in-home cameras, and arrests to enforce the 
79
 IHR, supra note 17.
80
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quarantine of over 740 people.82 These measures are all acceptable under the new IHR. While 
the IHR requires medical examinations to be the “least obtrusive [measures] . . . that would 
achieve the public health objective,”83 the same standard does not apply to vaccination, 
prophylaxis, isolation, or quarantine. Thus, a State may quarantine a person “ not giving his or 
her consent” when the State deems that “such a compulsory measure is necessary to control an 
imminent public health threat.”84 More importantly, “the revised Regulations do not contain 
requirements that States Parties accord those subject to compulsory measures due process 
protection, such as the right to challenge such measures in court.”85 This means that the IHR 
affirms a State’s right to restrict and protect its population as it sees fit. 
This is notable because the IHR does not attempt to limit or guide the use of quarantine. 
There are three reasons for making this an unquestionable state’s right. First, WHO would have 
no enforcement mechanisms. Adding superfluous or symbolic requirements to what are meant to 
be binding regulations weakens the overall system. Second, it is unlikely that Member States
would agree to give up sovereign rights of self-governance and domestic population control 
(even if it was merely an unenforceable gesture) because such an act might gestate binding 
international custom. Third, it is not in the interest of WHO or Member States to impose hard 
and fast limits on the ability of states to isolate sections of its population, even when extreme 
circumstances would implicate human rights. These regulations are not meant to symbolically 
handcuff states in the face of international public health threats, especially when those threats are 
82 Id. at 159, 164.
83
 IHR, supra note 17, at art. 23.
84 Security: The New IHR, supra note 22, at 45.
85 Id.
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unpredictable. As such, the threat the population’s welfare outweighs the lack of “compulsory 
due process protections, such as the right to challenge [quarantine] in court.”86
The SARS outbreak was instructive on this point. 740 people were under full quarantine 
measures within 24 days of the first SARS cases in Singapore.87 Through these measures, “the 
average time from onset of SARS symptoms to isolation of probable cases declined . . . from 6.8 
days to 1.3 days.”88 In total, there were 238 cases reported with a population density of 6,400
persons per square kilometer.89 In Hong Kong, more than 1,000 people were place in quarantine 
23 days after the first case.90 Hong Kong had a similar population density of 6,300 persons per 
square kilometer, but reported 1,755 cases in total.91 This data says nothing about how many or 
how quickly a state must quarantine to control the spread of infectious disease, but it does 
indicate that WHO is not is a position to uniformly constrain quarantine policy. Thus, by 
affirming national control of quarantine, the IHR preemptively defuses a politically controversial 
subject and promotes responses that are more adaptable.
II. THE AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
AND JUSTIFIED TRADE RESTRICTION
Not surprisingly, the IHR is not the system of international regulations that seek to 
protect against infectious disease. In 1998, WHO presented information to the World Trade 
86 Id.
87
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89 SARS, GOVERNANCE, AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 19, at 4; CIA World Factbook, Hong Kong, 
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Organization (“WTO”) on the IHR.92 The goal of this meeting was to coordinate the new public 
health measures of the IHR with the existing and binding public health framework of WTO.93
One of the founding pillars of WTO is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures.94 This agreement seeks to reduce international trade barriers by 
ensuring that “countries apply measures to protect human, animal and plant health based on 
assessment of risk.”95 Given that members of WHO are members of WTO and that WTO has 
binding enforcement mechanisms, WHO felt that “harmonizing the IHR and SPS Agreement
would reflect [a] common purpose and avoid any potential conflict in the obligations of Member 
States.”96 Consequently, the revised IHR was tailored to comport with the SPS Agreement. As 
such, one cannot understand the IHR or the complete infectious disease international law régime 
without a careful examination of WTO’s role in protecting public health.
A. The History and Scope of the SPS Agreement
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) became “the first 
multilateral trade agreement that attempted to provide rules for global trade.”97 The infrastructure 
of this agreement addressed the behavior of States that could affect public health.98 The framers 
of GATT attempted to “balance the sovereign right to keep out products that may threaten a 
92 The World Trade Organization and the IHR,  73 W EEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RECORD 233, 235-236 (WHO) 
(1998), available at http://www.who.int/docstore/wer/pdf/1998/wer7331.pdf. 
93 Id.
94 SPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 11. 
95 The World Trade Organization and the IHR,  73 W EEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RECORD 233, 235-236 (WHO) 
(1998), available at http://www.who.int/docstore/wer/pdf/1998/wer7331.pdf.
96 Id.
97
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nation’s health with disciplines to prevent this right from being misused for discriminatory or 
protectionist purposes.”99
In 1996, Britain reported several cases of mad-cow disease (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (“BSE”)), which scientists linked to a fatal human brain disease, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease.100 In reaction, the European Union (“EU”) banned all exports of British beef.101
By 1997, the disease claimed 10 human lives, and by 1999, the British beef industry had lost 
over $2.37 billion dollars.102 Though not in force at the time, this incident illustrates a clear 
public health emergency under Article XX(b) of GATT:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevails, or a distinguished restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.103
In the case of BSE, the disease posed a significant threat of spreading to domestic cattle and 
infecting humans. Britain would have had no recourse under GATT because the ban (1) was not 
arbitrary, (2) was not disguised or unjustifiably discriminatory, and (3) was meant to protect life 
and health.104
However, Article XX(b)’s coverage was not always clear. Parties made radical changes 
to GATT in the Uruguay Round.105 In 1993, WTO substantially replaced GATT and adopted the
SPS Agreement.106 The Agreement moved beyond Article XX(b) in two substantial ways. First, 
a protective sanitary trade measure meets the SPS Agreement if and only if it “is based on 
99 INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 13, at 121.
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scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.”107 In 1991, 
Peru reported a cholera outbreak with more than 300,000 infected persons.108 Due to worldwide 
bans of Peruvian imports, the country lost over $12.9 billion in trade.109 “Peru complained to the 
GATT Council repeatedly that the GATT rules were being ignored and other states were 
imposing trade-damaging health protection measures against Peru that lacked scientific support 
or clear public health rationales.”110 The SPS Agreement’s scientific justification clause solves 
this problem. “No longer can health policy that affects trade be created out of fear, superstition, 
or any other illegitimate basis” because trade restriction due to infectious disease outbreaks must 
be “made fairly and for legitimate reasons.”111
The second substantial difference in the SPS Agreement is that Member States must 
participate.112 As one of the founding WTO multilateral agreements, “any State wanting to 
become a Member State of WTO has to accept the SPS Agreement.”113 This means that WTO
has the authority to settle any dispute between Member States over protectionist trade bans 
“involving scientific or technical issues.”114 Unlike the GATT procedure where a party could 
block the decision of a dispute settlement panel, WTO’s dispute settlement panel allows states to 
impose trade sanctions for violations.115 Whereas under GATT, Peru had no practical means to 
attack “trade-damaging health measures that lack scientific rationale,” 116 the binding dispute 
settlement provisions attached to the SPS Agreement would assure Peru a chance to argue its 
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108
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position to WTO. Thus, the SPS Agreement is “the first international agreement attempting to 
balance trade and public health that contains a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.”117
B. The SPS Agreement, the Precautionary Principle, and Scientific Justification
Scientific justification under the SPS Agreement is a highly contentious issue when 
applied to the spread of infectious disease. Not surprisingly, when an infectious disease threatens 
to disrupt highly profitable trade, the strength and scope of the SPS Agreement come under fire. 
In 1999, the EU responded to the BSE scare by uniformly banning the use of animal remains 
with a high risk of containing BSE.118 The ban covered such things as the feed given to animals 
and secondary products containing animal parts.119 For example, the ban extended to foreign 
imports, including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and lubricants that contain tallow (boiled animal 
fat).120 Tallow derivatives are the key ingredients in more than $4.5 billion of U.S. 
pharmaceuticals exports.121 After negotiates with the U.S., the EU dropped its ban on products 
containing tallow, though EU officials maintained that soaps and cosmetics containing beef 
products could transmit BSE.122 In 2001, WTO’s SPS Committee met to discuss the application 
of the SPS Agreement to the BSE epidemic.123 One major point of contention was whether the 
EU’s trade barriers and risk classification system were “a legitimate exercise of the 
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precautionary principle.”124 Specifically, Peru, Chile, and the United States have complained that 
the EU’s restrictions on certain type of feed for cattle are not scientifically justified.125
The EU has taken the position that the SPS Agreement permits them “to ban a product as 
long as there is a legitimate belief that the product poses a threat to health and the environment 
even if no concrete scientific evidence supports such a belief.”126 However, the European 
Commission’s (“EC”) own communication states that the precautionary principle applies “where 
preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates that there are reasonable grounds for 
concern that [there are] potentially dangerous effects.”127 The implication of the EU’s new 
position is that under the precautionary principle “a state could prevent an import indefinitely 
until evidence convinces it otherwise.”128 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement clearly limits such an 
argument.129
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information . . . In such 
circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time.130
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Certainly, a ban on products shown to transmit BSE to humans or a ban on a feeding practices 
shown to transmit BSE between cattle would satisfy SPS requirements (even if the risk is
particularly low). However, no such evidence exists in this case.
Furthermore, WTO rejected similar arguments by the EC with respect to its ban on beef 
containing certain hormones in the late 1990s.131 In that case, WTO Appellate Panel noted, “the 
precautionary principle has been incorporated and given a specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement.”132 The Panel stated that it was responsible to determine “whether ‘sufficient 
scientific evidence’ exists to warrant the maintenance . . . of a particular SPS measure” and held 
that “the precautionary principle does not . . . relieve a panel from the duty of applying the 
normal (i.e. customary international law) principles of treaty interpretation in reading the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement.”133 Although the panel indicated that Member States disserve 
some deference when acting to protect against “irreversible . . . damage to human health” it
affirmatively stopped short of creating an SPS loophole devoid of scientific evidence.134
Through the SPS participation requirement and the enforcement mechanisms, WTO
affords nations the ability to demand objective and verifiable evidence to support trade barriers. 
This cleverly encourages nations to take a proactive role preventing infectious disease. Whereas
under GATT, a state could use the unverifiable prospective threat of disease to defy or 
continuously relitigated import bans, the new regime compels preventive and reactive research to 
protect domestic populations from harm and to protect exports from deceptive trade practices. 
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Thus, the SPS Agreement encourages infectious disease measures “based on international 
standards and recognition of equivalent standards that achieve the same level of protection.”135
III. THE ROLE OF THE IHR AND THE SPS AGREEMENT IN A H5N1 AVIAN FLU PANDEMIC
A. Hypothetical H5N1 Outbreak and the Application of International Regulations
One law and economics commentator noted that “even a ‘medium-level’ flu pandemic 
could cause up to 200,000 U.S. deaths and a purely economic impact (that is, ignoring the 
nonpecuniary cost of death and illness) of more than $150 billion.”136 According to other 
accounts, a ‘relatively minor’ H5N1 pandemic in Asia would likely cause a “loss of 6.5 per cent 
of Asian GDP, probably contributing to a global recession and reducing global trade of goods 
and services by 14 per cent, or $2,500 [billion dollars].”137 The question then is, ‘What role 
would the IHR and SPS Agreement play in the event of an avian flu out break?’
An outbreak of this kind could follow a pattern similar to that of the SARS outbreak, 
except on a larger scale. Suppose that in November 2008 a NGO in China reports that during the 
past week 1% of the population of Hong Kong (130,000) have begun showing flu-like 
symptoms. The Chinese government denies these reports, but begins substantially limiting travel 
into and out of the country and begins blackballing the foreign media. Suppose further that 
Singapore reports outbreaks of a mutated form of the H5N1 flu to WHO, and that t he 
Netherlands reports to WHO the localized transmission of an unknown pathogen to several 
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Rotterdam dockworkers, their families, and the staff at a local hospital (20 people, including 4 
Belgium nationals – 2 deaths). Singapore reports over 8,000 confirmed H5N1 cases with 1,050 
deaths, has ordered the in-home quarantine of over 20,000 citizens, and has stopped all egress 
travel. In response, Canada bans all travel or trade to or from China, Singapore, and the 
Netherlands and places a trade ban on all Belgium  chocolate.
Under the IHR, the situations in Singapore and China would clearly constitute an
international public health emergency.138 In both situations, there is a public health threat of 
spreading a serious disease that requires a coordinated international response.139 The IHR 
decision instrument properly compels Singapore to report the human infection and unexpected 
outbreak of new form influenza and the Siracusa Principles support Singapore’s containment 
policy,140 so long as it does not violate minimum human rights norms (i.e. those quarantined 
have access to food and water).141 Because China refuses to provide information about a possible 
outbreak, WHO may rely on reports from the NGO.142 If verified, the magnitude and the 
expectation of spreading compels WHO to declare the Chinese outbreak a health emergency of 
international concern.143 The situation in the Netherlands is less clear. The Netherlands may have 
been proper to report the outbreak because it is unexpected, carries a high potential for serious 
impact, and may affect international trade, but given the small size and unknown pathogen, there 
remains a subjective determination by the Dutch.144
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Under the SPS Agreement, Canada’s ban on all goods from China, Singapore, and the 
Netherlands is proper.145 Clearly, a sovereign nation may limit the traffic from Singapore who 
openly reports contamination. Similarly, the reported magnitude of the outbreak in China and the 
refusal of the Chinese government to cooperate with world health officials gives Canada just 
cause to close its borders to Chinese imports.146 Likewise, Canada’s reaction to the Dutch is 
defensible because there is an arguable link between Dutch dockworkers coming into contract 
with people or goods from Asia.147 However, the SPS Agreement would only allow this 
application of the Precaution Principle to run so long as the data supported Canada’s position.148
If the Netherlands reports that the outbreak is contained and unrelated to the outbreak in Asia, 
Canada would need either to submit scientific evidence to the contrary or drop its ban. Similarly, 
if several weeks go by with no new cases in Holland or health workers offered medically sound 
treatment and containment, Canada could not justify its position.149 Finally, Canada’s ban on 
Belgium chocolate would violate the SPS Agreement.150 The ban would be discriminatory, 
impacting only one particular item, and unju stified as no cases are reported in Belgium, merely 
cases of Belgium nations in Holland. 
B. Strengths and Weakness of International Regulations in a H5N1 Outbreak
As opposed to the old IHR, the new IHR is responsive and productive during this 
potential pandemic. Influenza was not a listed disease under the old IHR, and there was no 
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official influenza vaccination certification requirement . Despite the widespread outbreak of an 
identified infectious disease, under the old IHR Singapore would have no obligation to report to 
WHO or any other county the potential danger of a spreading pandemic. Though the flu-like 
symptoms in China raise the specter of a cholera outbreak, it too would have no duty to report an 
unidentified widespread illness. More to the point, with greater than $583 billion in exports in 
2004, China has a great deal of incentive to keep its export market secure by not reporting a 
domestic epidemic.151 Similarly, the Netherlands would have no reason to report any health 
concerns. It is possible that the illnesses was spread through unsatisfactory sanitary conditions in 
the Rotterdam seaport, but it is unlikely that a cost benefit analysis would impel the Netherlands 
take reactive reporting and sanitary measures in light of the limited disease transmission. Lastly, 
the old IHR would not sustain Canada’s imposition of health measures on incoming vessels 
because the old IHR would not support health measures greater than its own.
The new regulations eliminate many of these problems and allow WHO to play an 
important role in the public health emergencies of all three countries. First, the IHR creates a 
system where WHO can collect data and coordinate a response. By using NGO public health 
data, the IHR compels China to mitigate the impact on exports when WHO makes an 
unsanctioned infectious disease report. Rectifying public health emergencies and suppressing 
cross border disease transmission is a positive sum effort, but issues of sovereignty, lack of 
resources, and lack of motivation would normally limit the international response of individual 
nations. Through the IHR, WHO can also use NGO and national health data to identify the 
similarities of the China/Singapore/Netherlands outbreaks, track the geographic transmission 
pathways, analyze the threat to other nations, and coordinate an international response to 
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mitigate the harm and prevent further spreading. Second, although the IHR affirms Singapore’s 
internal quarantine policy, the international involvement promotes scrutiny of human rights.
Though merely a peer pressure system of human rights, IHR’s approach is comparatively 
progressive to the old regime and creates a framework to build upon. Moreover, combined with 
WHO’s response coordination, the IHR raises the likelihood of international particip ation in 
funding and maintaining humane quarantine conditions.
The weaknesses of the IHR are similar to those in other international regulations. First, 
enforcement could be highly problematic, if possible at all. WHO has no recourse to China’s 
refusal to cooperate with health officials. Moreover, under some circumstances, WHO’s usage of
NGO data could backfire. One can foresee China or Russia further restraining the freedom of 
NGOs and lessening transparency when a situation threatens export profits. Second, developing 
nations with limited public health resources face the same problems under the new IHR. 
International interest in countries with limited trade value will likely wane. As a result, for some 
countries the new IHR could devolve into a de facto reactive system. 
The positive and negative value of the SPS Agreement during this outbreak is much less 
clear. Prior the outbreak however, the Agreement’s benefit is substantial. The scientific 
justification requirement creates a dual sword and shield for nations who largely depend on 
international trade. China and the rest of Asia have a strong stimulus to perform research on 
H5N1 and develop both preventive and reactive scientific solutions. With the knowledge that 
Canada could uniformly ban all Chinese exports, China would want to implement prophylactic 
measures both on its bird and human populations. Furthermore, with an effective domestic 
response mechanism and scientific evidence of a working inoculation, China would have the 
tools combat an unreasonable and harmful Canadian trade barrier. Thus, the SPS Agreement 
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encourages proactive and reactive infectious disease response, and creates a system of scientific 
information leverage in trade disputes. 
Despite this potential, the weakness of the SPS Agreement during this outbreak is 
significant. First, the scientific leverage maybe largely symbolic. As with genetically modified 
foods in Europe or fear of mad-cow disease in Japan, if the internal political and social pressure 
is sufficient, Canada will ban all Chinese goods despite credible evidence that such a reaction 
would be scientifically unjustifiable. Conversely, as import markets grow dependent on Chinese 
goods, domestic forces could prevent a uniform trade ban despite compelling scientific evidence. 
Thus, as a reactionary tool, the SPS Agreement may be minimally influential. The second 
problem is time. Here, Singapore has 1,050 H5N1 deaths in one week. The threat of a binding 
dispute resolution one to two years after the first trade barriers would be have no impact on the 
actual reactions of other nations. Such a dispute resolution could provide retroactive relief once 
the pandemic is over, but like all permissive WTO trade sanctions, a positive resolution would 
largely be constrained by the practicalities of any changing prices in domestic market. Finally, as 
with other aspects of the WTO, some might claim that the SPS Agreement disregards the needs
of developing nations. With limited (or no) research capabilities, developing nations would have 
no argument against trade or travel bans if a developed nation claims such bans are scientifically 
reasonable. Thus, the SPS Agreement leaves developing nations in a position of weakness 
similar to that experienced under GATT.
In conclusion, one should applaud the development and maturity of the IHR and SPS 
Agreement as compared to their respective predecessors. The IHR is a foundational agreement 
allowing the international community to designate WHO as the central data collection body to 
help prevent outbreak and to coordinate a response that mitigates the impact on infected 
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populations and international neighbors. Likewise, the SPS Agreement cultivates a scientific 
justification standard and provides a neutral forum for disputes. Much like environmental 
international law, these regulations possess weaknesses in enforcement and time constraints that 
can nullify their value, but from a broad perceptive are clearly progressive. They acknowledge 
and promote flexible responses by sovereign nations without over reaching. They create
incentive for information sharing and encouraging an international body to lead the positive sum 
effort to prevent and control public health emergencies. As such, the IHR and SPS Agreement 
are important in the evolution of beneficial and accepted international law.
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